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DiBona v. Matthews: Clear and Present

Danger for California Collegiate
Administrators Exercising Curriculum
Control?

"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students." ' Since the Supreme Court of the United States
advanced this proposition in 1969, federal and state courts alike
have struggled to strike a balance between the right of
administrators to control the school environment and the free
speech rights of students and faculty.2 This balance was the issue
presented to a California Court of Appeal in DiBona v. Matthews.'
The dispute which led to the DiBona lawsuit began when Alan
DiBona, a part-time drama teacher at a community college in
Southeast San Diego, decided to produce a play called Split
Second' as his summer drama workshop project. 5 Split Second
depicts one of the ugliest aspects of racial discord: A black man
1. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Tinker involved three
high school students who were suspended for wearing black armbands to school to protest the
Vietnam War. Id. at 504. The Court held that the Constitution does not permit state officials to
censor student speech that does not "materially or substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Id. at 509.
2. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that a
school board may not remove books from high school library shelves simply because the board
dislikes the ideas contained in the books); Steele, MandatoryStudent Fees At Public Universities:
Bringing the FirstAmendment Within the Campus Gate, 13 J.C.U.L 353 (1987) (examination of
how courts have balanced first amendment rights of students against rights of public universities
to provide a forum for viewpoint exchange).
3. 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 557 (1990).
It is likely the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari based upon the issues of
standing and mootness raised by the DiBona opinion. See DiBona at 1338-40, 269 Cal. Rptr. at
887-88 (majority's standing and mootness discussion); id. at 1349-51, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 894-96
(Huffman, J., dissenting) (dissent's standing and mootness discussion).
4. Dennis McIntyre, Split Second (Samuel French, Inc., 1984).
5. DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1333, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884 (1990).
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who has suffered a lifetime of discrimination is driven beyond his
breaking point and lashes out against a person who symbolizes the
ignorance and ugliness of his oppressors. 6 DiBona tried to produce
Split Second in a community racked by racial tension following the
clash between a black youth and two white police officers that
resulted in the death of one officer and the critical wounding of the
7
other.
Although originally expressing no concern over DiBona's
choice to produce Split Second, the community college
administrators decided not to allow DiBona to produce the play
after community church leaders expressed their disapproval of the
play's content! DiBona and a student cast member filed an
unsuccessful action to enjoin the administration's cancellation of
the play.' They then brought a second action for declaratory and
injunctive relief."t
The trial court hearing this second action granted the defendant
college administrators' motion for summary judgment, finding that
the administrators had acted properly in canceling Split Second
under the circumstances." On appeal, the California Court of12
Appeal for the Fourth District reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that college administrators could not censor the production
of a play if there was no indication the play would create a clear
and present danger of serious, substantive evil rising above public
unrest or annoyance, 3 or that the play would materially and

6.

See infra notes 101 - 108 and accompanying text (discussing plot of Split Second).

7.

See infra notes 100 - 127 and accompanying text (discussing facts surrounding DiBona

opinion).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

DiBona,220 Cal. App. 3d
Id. at 1350, 269 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr.
Id.
Id. at 1348, 269 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 1342, 269 Cal. Rptr.

at 1334, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
at 895.
at 886.
at 894.
at 890 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4

(1949)). Terminiello held that speech is protected against censorship unless "shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest". Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. See also CAL. EDUC. CODE §
76120 (West 1989) (prohibiting speech that would incite students and create a clear and present
danger of unlawful acts being committed on the community college premises).
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substantially interfere with the operation of the school. 4
Additionally, the appellate court stated that no authority existed that
would allow college administrators to censor Split Second simply
because the play contained vulgar language."
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the DiBona opinion and
determine what impact, if any, DiBona may have on college and
university administrators as they attempt to exercise curriculum
control consistently with principles of free speech. Part I of this
Note will examine general first amendment principles as they apply
to determining the proper balance between the rights of students
and teachers on the one hand, and the rights of administrators to
control the "special" school environment on the other.16 Part I
will analyze the DiBona opinion. 7 Finally, Part Il will explore
the impact the DiBona opinion may have on the first amendment
rights of administrators and students in California's institutions of
higher education.18
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

General FirstAmendment Principles
1. Protectedand Unprotected Speech

The first amendment forbids Congress to make any law
abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the people to

14.

DiBona, 220 Cal.App.3d at 1343, 269 Cal.Rptr. at 890-91 (citing Tinker v. Des

Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). Tinker held that high school officials can

prohibit expression if the expression will "materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
15. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346-47,269 Cal. Rptr. at 893. Cf.Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that, in the high school setting,
administrators do not violate a student's frst amendment rights by exercising editorial control
over the content of student speech in "school-sponsored expressive activities" such as school
newspapers and drama productions, so long as their actions are "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns"). See infra notes 63 - 68 and accompanying text (discussing Kuhimeier).
16. See infra notes 19 -99 and accompanying text. See also supra note 1 (quoting the
Tinker Court's description of the school environment as "'special").
17.
18.

See infra notes 100 - 188 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189 - 213 and accompanying text.
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peaceably assemble. 9 One goal of the first amendment is to
prevent the government from dictating what ideas are right or
wrong.2" Instead, the free trade of ideas must be encouraged so
that the truthfulness of an idea is tested in the competition of the
"market" of ideas.21 To advance this goal, it is generally
aceepted that no government, federal or state, 2 may deny a
citizen the fundamental right to speak, particularly regarding
matters of public concern, unless the speech presents a clear and
present danger of serious evil or harm to a substantial government
interest.z
Not all speech, however, is provided unconditional first
amendment protection.24 Certain speech, such as obscenity,' is
considered nonessential to an exchange of ideas with little social
value as "a step to truth.", 26 Because the Court has concluded that
obscene materials are unprotected, 27 these materials may be
censored by the government so long as the censoring regulation is
carefully limited in its definition of obscenity. 8

19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Cf.CAL. CONST. art. I § 2 (providing that "[e]very person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."). Although the
California constitutional guarantee of free speech was interpreted to be broader than its first '
amendment counterpart in Wilson v. SuperiorCourt, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119
Cal. Rptr. 468, 472, (1975), the DiBona opinion does not address application of the California
Constitution's free speech guarantee.
20. See Virginia Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
21. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
22. The frst amendment applies to the states through incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
23. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Additionally, the evil must be one
that Congress or the state has a right to prevent. Id.
24. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (describing the welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech which do not merit constitutional protection). Not
all speech listed by Chaplinsky is still considered unprotected. See e.g., New York imes v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (providing conditional constitutional protection to libelous
speech directed at public officials).
25. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity as works which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and which, taken as a whole, have no
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.)
26. Chaplnsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
27. Miller,413 U.S. at 23.
28. Id. at 23-25.
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2. Governmental Regulation of Protected Speech--The Forum
Distinction
Over the last twenty years, Supreme Court decisions dealing
with challenges to the constitutionality of government regulation of
protected speech have engaged in an analysis to determine the type
of forum in which the speech before the Court has taken place. 29
The Court utilizes the forum analysis to determine when the
government can restrict speech on the government's property
without violating the first amendment. 30 The extent to which the
government can restrict public access to governmental property for
expressive purposes depends upon the nature of the forum in
question. 31 The public forum doctrine requires that speech
restrictions be subjected to higher scrutiny when the speech occurs
in areas historically associated with first amendment activities.32 33
In Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators Assn.
the Court identified three forums: (1) the traditional public forum,
such as streets and parks; (2) public property opened for use as a
place for expressive activity; and (3) public property that is not
traditionally, or by designation, open as a forum for public
expression (referred to as a nonpublic forum). 34 The government
may regulate the time, place, and manner of protected speech
taking place in a public forum35 so long as the regulations are
neutral as to the content of the speech and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication. 36 However, if the

29. See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990) (stating that since the
Supreme Court's decision in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court
has adopted a forum analysis).
30. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
31. Id.
32. L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSnTuTONAL LAw § 12-24, at 987 (1988).
33. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
34. Id. at 45-46.
35. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). For example, the Schneider court held that
while a municipality could not forbid distribution of handbills, it could enact regulations against
disseminating the handbills by throwing them into the street. Id. at 160-61.
36. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470 (1980) (stating that the
Supreme Court has often declared that a state may protect individual privacy by enacting
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content).
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government desires to regulate protected speech in a public forum
based upon the content of the speech, the government must show
that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest." On the other hand, if the protected speech is presented
in a nonpublic forum, the speech may be regulated by the
government so long as the regulation is reasonable and is not based
solely on opposition to the speaker's views." Under this standard,
access to a nonpublic forum can be restricted based on the subject
matter of the speech or on the speaker's identity so long as the
restrictions are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the
purpose of the forum. 9
Because designation of the forum as public or nonpublic
impacts the ability of the government to regulate speech occurring
in the forum, it is often critical to the outcome of a first
amendment challenge to determine what type of forum is involved.
For example, in Greer v. Spock,4" several political candidates
were denied access to the sidewalks and streets within Fort Dix for
the purpose of discussing election issues with military personnel
and their families. 41 The plaintiffs argued that because the streets
and sidewalks of Fort Dix were open to civilian traffic, and
because civilian speakers had occasionally been invited to speak at
the base, the base was a public forum and the plaintiffs should be
allowed access for campaigning purposes. 2 However, the
Supreme Court held that simply because members of the public
were allowed to freely visit property owned and operated by the
government did not mean a public forum for purposes of the first

37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The classic example of a compelling state interest arises when
someone falsely shouts "fire'
in a crowded theater. The state has every right to protect its

citizens from this speech in this circumstance because of the likelihood of harm the speech
creates. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
38. Perry,460 U.S. at 46.
39. Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, 806. See infra notes 46 -54 and accompanying text
(discussing prohibition of viewpoint-based discrimination).
40. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
41. Id. at 832-33.
,42. Id. at 830-32.
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amendment had been created.43 Fort Dix was devoted to military
training, and the government was free to restrict access to the
forum in keeping with that military mission." Indeed, in later
decisions the Supreme Court has held that the government does not
create a public forum unless it intentionally opens a nontraditional
forum for public expression.'
3. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
Regardless of the forum, speech may not be suppressed by the
government if the suppression is viewpoint-based.' Even if the
expression occurs in a nonpublic forum, the fact that reasonable
grounds exist for limiting access to that nonpublic forum will not
save a regulation that is merely a disguise or pretense for
viewpoint-based discrimination.47
An example of viewpoint-based discrimination can be seen in
Healy v. James. 48 In Healy, the president of a state college in
Connecticut denied official recognition to a chapter of the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) 49 because the president believed
the organization adhered to a philosophy of violence and
disruption.5 ° As a result, the SDS was unable to hold meetings in
campus facilities, use campus bulletin boards to post

43.

Id. at 836.

44.

Id. at 838 & n.10.

45. Cornelius v. NAACP Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). See infra notes
207-209 (discussing the possibility that school administrators could create a public forum through
curriculum such as a school newspaper or drama productions if the administrators failed to retain

control over the content of the curriculum).
46. Id. at 811. In Perry, the Court determined that the school was not discriminating on
the basis of viewpoint by excluding one union from having access to school mail facilities after
an opposing union won the right to exclusive representation of the teachers. Perry, 460 U.S. at
48-49. The Court believed it was more accurate to characterize the access policy as being based
on the "status" of the unions rather than on their respective viewpoints. Id. See infra notes 210 213 and accompanying text (questioning whether the court's holding in DiBona v. Matthews can
be understood as limited to prohibiting viewpoint-based discrimination).
47. Cornelius,473 U.S. at 811.
48. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
49. Id. at 174.
50. Id. at 187.
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announcements, or place announcements in the school
newspaper."' Conceding that a college has a legitimate interest in
preventing campus disruption, and that this interest might justify
banning student organizations that may prove to be disruptive, the
Court held that a "heavy burden" rests on the college to
demonstrate the appropriateness of banning the student
organization. 2 The Court went on to hold that it was
impermissible to deny recognition to the group based upon the
administration's disagreement with the group's philosophy. 3 The
Court stated that a college, as an instrumentality of the state,
cannot restrict speech simply because it finds the views expressed
54
by a group to be abhorrent.
B. BalancingFirstAmendment Rights and Control of the School
Environment
1. School Administration'sRegulation of NoncurricularSpeech
Fundamental to the guarantee of free speech is the availability
of opportunities for all types of expression. 55 This ensures that a
desired message can be conveyed and received.56 The right to
receive ideas and information is recognized as particularly
important for students because receiving information prepares them
to effectively participate in our diverse society.57 However, in
Tinker v. Des Moines School District,8 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the first amendment rights of students and
teachers must be balanced with the comprehensive authority of
59
states and school officials to control conduct in public schools.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 176.
Id at 184.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187-88.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50,76 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).

56.

Id. (Powell, J., concurring).

57.
58.

Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).

59.

Id. at 506-07.
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In Tinker, the Court held that it offended the Constitution to
allow public high school officials to forbid students to wear black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War when the officials did not
foresee that wearing the armbands would cause substantial
disruption or material interference with school activities, and no
such disruption in fact occurred.' The Tinker Court stated that in
order for school officials to justify prohibiting student speech, the
officials must be able to show that they acted on something more
than a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."" Under the
Tinker standard, unless the student's speech materially disrupts
class work, substantially disrupts the operation of the school, or
invades the rights of others, school officials may not
constitutionally restrict the student's freedom of expression. 2
2. School Administration'sRegulation of Curriculum
In contrast to the noncurricular student speech taking place in
Tinker, the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier63 sets a different standard
of review when the issue is curriculum control. In Kuhlmeier, the
Court was asked to decide whether a principal's editorial control
over a high school newspaper invaded the first amendment rights
of the student authors.' After determining the school newspaper,
Spectrum, was part of the curriculum, and that the school did not
create a public forum by publishing the newspaper as part of the
student's class work,' the Court held that the high school

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 513.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).

64.

M. at264.

65. Id. at 270. Because no public forum had been created, school officials were allowed to
impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the
school community. Id. at 267. The Court decided Spectrum was not a public forum because
school officials did not demonstrate a clear intent to create a public forum. Id. To support its
position, the Court found that the school's policy allowed school officials to retain ultimate
control over the content of Spectrum. Id. at 269. Additional factors relied upon by the Court
included: (1) The school policies stated that the journalism class responsible for producing
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administrators did not violate the first amendment by exercising
control over the content of this school-sponsored" expressive
activity so long as the control was "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 6 7 The KuhImeier Court determined that
the principal's censorship of articles dealing with divorce and
pregnancy was reasonably related to his concern that "frank talk"
contained in the articles was inappropriate in a publication
distributed to fourteen-year-old high school freshmen.68 In
contrast, if the Court had followed the "material and substantial
disruption" standard set forth in Tinkero the principal would not
have been able to censor the articles because there was no showing
that the articles would have materially or substantially disrupted
class work or the operation of the school, or invaded the rights of
other students.7"
Kuhlmeier has already been interpreted by other courts as
granting wide latitude to elementary and secondary school
administrators in controlling the school's curriculum. 7' For

Spectrum was taught by a faculty member within regular school hours, and students received
grades and academic credit for their work on the paper, (2) the journalism teacher had the
authority to, and in fact did exercise control over Spectrum; and (3) the school's policy required
that the principal review each issue of Spectrum prior to publication. Id. at 268-69. The Court did
not accept that a public forum was created merely because an issue of Spectrum contained a
Statement of Policy declaring that Spectrum "'accepted all rights implied by the First
Amendment." Id. at 269. See supra notes 29 - 45 and accompanying text (discussing the public
forum doctrine).
66. See infra notes 152 - 155 and accompanying text (discussing the "schoolsponsorship" rationale).
67. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273.
68. Id. at 274-75.
69. See supra notes 58 - 62 and accompanying text (discussing the Tinker decision).
70. Kuhmeler, 484 U.S. at 265-66.
71. See Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School Dist., 887 F.2d 935, 946 (9th Cir.
1989) (relying on Kuhlmeier to find that a school could refuse to publish an advertisement from
Planned Parenthood in the school's newspaper, yearbooks, and athletic event programs); Crosby
v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802-03 (4th Cir. 1988) (following Kuhlmeler to allow a school
principal to eliminate the school mascot because the mascot offended black students and limited
their participation in school activities); Krizek v. Cicero-Stickney Township High School Dist.,
713 F. Supp. 1131, 1139 (N.D. IIl. 1989) (holding that because under Kuhimeier the school board
could have legitimately banned the showing of a film to eleventh graders due to the film's
content, the school board did not violate a nontenured teacher's first amendment rights by not
renewing her contract because she showed the film); McCarthy v. Fletcher, 207 Cal. App. 3d 130,
145-46, 254 Cal. Rptr. 714, 723 (1989) (applying Kuhlmeier's legitimate pedagogical concern
standard to allow California high school administrators to censor extra-curricular reading
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example, in Virgil v. School Board2 a Florida district court
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of high school
administrators who banned a humanities textbook from the high
school's curriculum.73 The textbook contained a play by
Aristophanes and a poem by Chaucer that the school board deemed
vulgar and unsuitable for eleventh and twelfth graders.74 In
rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the school board could not
ban a book that was already part of the curriculum, 75 the district
court reluctantly applied Kuhlmeier and held that the first
amendment was not violated so long as the curriculum decision
was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, 76 even
though in this case the "legitimate concern" was the exposure of

recommendations by teachers). But see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1150 (9th Cir. 1988)
(following Kuhlmeier, but distinguishing the speech involved-an unauthorized student-written
newspaper-as speech that must be tolerated by the school, rather than speech that the school may
censor because the speech could appear to be affirmatively promoted by the school); Ramano v.
Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to apply Kuhlmeier where school
paper was "school-sponsored" in terms of funding from the Board of Education, but was an
ungraded, extra-curricular activity); Leeb v. DeLong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 54, 243 Cal. Rptr.
494, 497-98 (1988) (holding that because the Califomia Education Code clearly places editorial
control of student publications on student editors, the broad power to censor these publications
granted to administrators in Kuhimeier is not available to educators in California). See also CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1990) (statute relied on in Leeb).
72. 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aft'd, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 1549.
74. Id.
75. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (holding that a school board
could not remove discretionary reading books from a junior/senior high school's library; however,
if the books were never purchased, the school board was under no duty to add the books to the
collection). The Pico plurality distinguished the removal of books from the addition of books to
the library shelves. Id. The plurality found the removal of books inappropriate because removal
signified a suppression of ideas and an attempt to prescribe the appropriate opinions regarding
political, national, or religious matters. Id. However, the dissent in Pico stated that the decision to
remove books is not any different than the decision to add books in terms of "official
suppression." Id. at 892-93 & n.8 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). It is interesting to note that this
argument was not raised by the Virgil plaintiffs on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Instead,
plaintiffs argued that Kuhlreier did not control because the offensive portions of the textbook
were optional readings for an elective course. Virgil v. School Board, 862 F.2d 1517, 1522 (11th
Cir. 1989).
76. See Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264 (holding that control
over the content of school-sponsored expressive activities does not violate the first amendment so
long as the control is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns). See also supra notes
63 - 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Kuhlmeier opinion).
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young minds to "vulgar and unsuitable materials" such as classic
Greek literature and Renaissance poetry.'
The broad deference given to elementary and secondary school
administrators to exercise curriculum control as advanced in
KuhImeier and Virgil has not yet been specifically granted to
college administrators by the Supreme Court of the United
States.7" Although the Court has not ruled on the specific balance
to be struck between student and faculty first amendment rights and
the right of administrators to control curriculum choices at the
college level,79 the Court has indicated that it is necessary to
guard first amendment rights more rigorously on college campuses
than on the campuses of elementary or high schools.8 "
Additionally, in opinions dealing with issues pertinent to college
and university campuses, although not specifically relating to
curriculum control, the Court has indicated great respect for the
first amendment rights of university and college students and
faculty members.8 "

77. Virgil, 677 F. Supp. at 1551.
78. See Kuhlmeier,484 U.S. at 274 n.7 (Court specifically defers deciding whether the
same degree of deference granted to elementary and high school administrators to control schoolsponsored expressive activities should be granted to college and university administrators).
79. This is precisely the issue raised in DiBona v. Mathews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 269
Cal. Rptr. 882 (1990). See infra notes 100 - 188 and accompanying text (discussing the DiBona
opinion).
80. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1969) (holding that frst amendment
protections should apply with the same force on a college campus as they do in the community at
large). See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that in its role a educator, the government is subject to fewer constitutional restraints
when operating an elementary or secondary school than when operating a college or university).
Justice Rehnquist's statement that the government is more restricted when it attempts to censor
college or university speech appears to be an accurate reflection of several justices currently
sitting on the Court. For example, in his concurrence Justice Blackmun stated that a school beard
could refuse to make a book available to a student because the book was inappropriate for that
student's age group. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, L, concurring). Additionally, Justice O'Connor, in
joining in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, joined in the Chief Justice's finding that
"fundamental values" could not be inculcated except by having primary and secondary school
boards make content-based decisions about the appropriateness of materials within the school
library and curriculum. Id. at 889 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See generally supra notes 48 - 54 and
accompanying text (discussing the Healy opinion).
81. See Papish v. Univ. of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (finding that the
dissemination of ideas on a state university campus may not be shut off merely because the ideas
are in bad taste or offend conventions of decency).
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An example of the Court's respect for first amendment rights
on college campuses can first be seen in the 1957 decision in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.8 2 Sweezy, a college lecturer, refused
to answer questions put to him by the New Hampshire Attorney
General 3 relating to a lecture Sweezy had given at the University
of New Hampshire. Finding this line of questioning in violation
of Sweezy's liberty interest in academic freedom and political
expression, the Sweezy Court stated that academic freedom in
American universities is essential because of the vital role played
by those who guide and train our youth.85 To impose a straitjacket
on intellectual leaders of colleges and universities would be to
imperil the nation's future because scholarly thinking cannot
flourish when surrounded by an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust.8 6 College teachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, study, and evaluate so that they may gain new
understandings and save our society from stagnation. 7
Ten years later, the Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents'
reiterated the reasoning in Sweezy and invalidated a New York
statute barring university professors from employment because of
their affiliation with the Communist Party of America. 9 Although
conceding the legitimacy of New York's interest in protecting its
educational system from subversion, 9° the Court held that the first
amendment would not tolerate "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom." 9 The Court found that the classroom is
"peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas," ' 92 and that vigilant

82.
83.

354 U.S. 234 (1957).
Id. at 236-38. Sweezy was being questioned pursuant to New Hampshire's Subversive

Activities Act of 1951, which was enacted to protect against the perceived threat of communism.
Id.
84.

Id. at 243-44.

85. Id. at 250.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88.

385 U.S. 589 (1967).

89.
90.
91.

Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.

92. Id.
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protection of constitutional freedoms is vital in American
universities.93
If extended to curriculum control in the university setting, it is
possible to view the Kuhimeier "legitimate pedagogical concern"
standard as a departure by the Court from the broad, almost
idealistic respect accorded American university students and faculty
in Sweezy and Keyishian because in essence, the Kuhlmeier
standard could be applied so as to allow censorship in curriculum
matters, such as textbooks and course offerings, so long as the
administration can articulate a reasonable explanation for
forbidding certain expression. However, one federal court of
appeals adopted the Kuhlmeier standard for curriculum control in
a university setting because the court believed it was essential to
academic freedom that university administrators who reasonably
regulated speech and campus activities be given great deference by
federal courts in matters of curriculum choice.' In Alabama
Student Party v. Student Government Association of the University
of Alabama,95 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted
that while academic freedom thrives on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, it also
thrives on autonomous decision-making by administrators.96 The
court believed the Kuhlmeier "legitimate pedagogical concern"
standard achieved this goal.97

93.
94.

Id.
Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't. Assn. of the Univ. of Alabama 867 F.2d

1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that because the university viewed its student government
association as a "'learning laboratory," the university had created a nonpublic forum reserved as a
supervised learning experience for the students). Because this learning laboratory took on

characteristics of speech promoted by the university, the university was entitled to place
reasonable restrictions on the learning experience consistent with the university's legitimate
pedagogical concern in minimizing the disruptive effect of campus electioneering. Id. Therefore,
the court upheld regulations restricting distribution of campaign literature and limiting open
forums or debates to the week of the election. Id. at 1345. But see Student Gov't. Assn. v. Bd. of
Trustees of the Univ. of Massachusetts, 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir., 1989) (interpreting
Kuhlmeier as inapplicable to college newspapers because the Kuhlmeier Court specifically refused
to decide whether the holding should apply to universities or colleges).
95. 867 F.2d 1344 (llth Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1347 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226
(1985)).
97. Id.
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In contrast, the California Court of Appeal in DiBona v.
Matthews rejected the Kuhlmeier standard. 98 Faced with whether
censorship of a play by a college administration can be justified
when the administration gave the teacher freedom to choose the
play, but stepped in to forbid production after the play had been
cast because the administrators objected to the language in the play
and there were indications that portions of the surrounding
community objected to the play's content, the DiBona majority
takes a more restrictive stand on a college administrator's ability
to censor curriculum. 99
II. THE CASE
A.

The Facts

In the summer of 1986, Alan DiBona was hired by the San
Diego Community College District (District) to teach a drama class
at the Educational Cultural Complex (ECC), a community college
located in southeast San Diego.1°" DiBona decided his class
would produce Split Second, a play that tells the story of a black
police officer (Val) who chases down and apprehends a white
suspect in a deserted back alley of a big city on the fourth of
July. 01 While waiting for a patrol car to transport them to the
police station, the suspect verbally attacks Val with racially
offensive, degrading epithets that represent to Val the lifetime of
prejudice he has had to endure."0 Although the suspect presents
no physical threat, Val becomes enraged beyond reason, draws his

98. DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1346-47, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 892-93
(1990).
99. See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text (setting forth the holding in the
DiBona opinion).
100. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1333, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
101. Id. at 1333, 269 Cal. Rptr. 884. See Split Second, supra note 4, Act 1, Scene I.
102. See Split Second, supra note 4, Act I, Scene 1 (depicting the the encounter between
Val and the suspect where the suspect hurls abusive statements such as 'spearchucker" and
"'fucking nigger cop" at Val, that all black policemen should be shipped to Africa to direct traffic
in the jungle).
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service revolver and shoots the suspect through the heart. 10 3 Val
then plants a knife in the dead man's hand and fabricates a selfdefense story to explain the shooting."
The remainder of the play deals with Val's struggle between
telling the truth or living with the lie he has created."°5 If he tells
the truth, he will lose his wife and his job, 6 and his fellow
black officers will suffer the stigma of the "black cop gone bad"
attitude from a predominantly white police force.01 7 Alternatively,
by living with the lie, Val will always know he did not take
responsibility for his actions.'
DiBona's decision to produce Split Second coincided with, and
was probably inspired by, the murder trial of Sagon Penn. °9
Penn, a young black man living in southeast San Diego, was
accused of fatally shooting one white police officer and seriously
wounding a second officer and a female observer."0 Penn pled
self-defense, claiming the officers verbally abused and physically
assaulted him."' During the time DiBona attempted to produce
Split Second, Penn was acquitted of murder112 and the
prosecution decided to retry him for voluntary manslaughter. 3
Although the ECC did not require teachers to obtain approval
from the administration for the play to be performed in a drama
class, DiBona discussed the content of Split Second with Robert
Matthews, the president of ECC and a defendant in the DiBona

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Split Second, supra note 4, Act I, Scenes 2-4; id. Act II, Scenes 1-5.
106. IX, Act. 11, Scene 2.
107. Id., Act. 11, Scene 3.
108. Id., Act 11, Scene 4.
109. DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1335, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 885 (1990).
110. Id. The black community of San Diego viewed Penn's trial as an opportunity to bring
to the public's attention the perceived practice of the San Diego police force to verbally and
physically harass minorities. Bunting, Police Actions Also on Trial in San Diego Officer's Death,
Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1986, § 2, at 1, ol. 1.
111. Bunting, supra, note 110 at 1.
112. See Sagan Penn Innocent of Murder, Los Angeles Tunes, June 27, 1986, § 1, at 3, ol.
1.
113. See Schachter, Retrial of Suspect in Slaying of San Diego Officer Planned,Los
Angeles Tumes, July 11, 1986, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
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case, in late May 1986.114 Apparently Matthews voiced no
objections to Split Second at that time.' DiBona cast the play by
June 13, prior to the commencement of summer school classes on
June 16.116
On June 16, defendant Matthews received a phone call from
the past president of the ECC informing him that certain
community church leaders did not approve of the production of
Split Second.117 Matthews relayed this concern to DiBona, who
in turn informed his class at their first meeting that the play was
being put "on hold" by the administration.18 Matthews also
obtained and skimmed through a script of Split Second, and at that
point concluded that the play was not appropriate for production at
the ECC."9 Urged by DiBona and two student cast members to
reconsider his decision, Matthews read the entire script and
requested defendant James Hardison, the ECC dean, do the
same. 2 ' After reading the script, Hardison informed DiBona that
Split Second could not be produced at the ECC.' Hardison also

114. DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1334, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884 (1990).
115. Id. See infra notes 161 - 167 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
significance of the timing of censorship).
116. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1334, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
117. Id. The opinion never specified who the "church leaders" were or exactly why they
objected to the production of Split Second. It is possible that the language contained in Split
Second was enough to cause objection. However, it is more likely that the objections stemmed
from the parallels between the Sagon Penn murder trial and the subject matter of Split Second.
See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the Sagon Penn murder trial and the trial
court's determination that this alone justified the cancellation of Split Second).
118. DiBona,220 Cal. App. 3d at 1335, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 885. For this reason, DiBona did
not submit the enrollment cards for the students cast in his play to the ECC registrar's office. Id.
at 1335, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86. Since it was the custom for students to wait until they were
cast in a show before adding the Drama 250 course to their curriculum and paying the requisite
fee, there were only three students officially enrolled in the course at the time the class was
canceled. Id. at 1334, 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr. 884-85. Because the ECC's general policy was to
cancel classes with enrollment of less than ten students, DiBona's Drama 250 class was canceled
on June 17, 1986, the same day defendants made their final decision not to allow Split Second to
be produced. Id. at 1335-36, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86. However, DiBona was never informed the
class was canceled due to low enrollment. Id. at 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 886. According to
DiBona, defendant James Hardison, the ECC dean, told DiBona the class was canceled because of
the "sensitivity of the community to the subject matter." id. at 1335, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
119. Id. at 1334, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
120. Id. at 1335, 269 CaL Rptr. at 885.
121. Id.

989

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
rejected DiBona's request to allow the students to receive credit for
a private performance of the play." 2
DiBona and one of the students, plaintiff Scott Gundlach, filed
an action for injunctive relief in 1986, petitioning for a writ of
supersedeas from the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District. After the court of appeal denied their request for a
preliminary injunction, DiBona and Gundlach filed an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violation of their
constitutional rights under the first amendment." 4 Defendants
Matthews and Hardison moved for summary judgment, arguing
mootness and lack of standing," 5 and lack of any first
amendment violations. 2 6 The trial court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment,2 7 and the plaintiffs appealed.
B. The Majority Opinion
Although the case was before the court of appeal for resolution
of a motion for summary judgment, the majority characterized the
record before the court as similar to the record following a full
trial."2 After disposing of the procedural issues,129 the court
122. Id. at 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 885. Although DiBona and the student cast members
ultimately performed the play off-campus, none of the students received course credit and DiBona
was not compensated for teaching the course. Id. at 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
123. Id. at 1350, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
124. Id. at 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
125. Both the majority and dissenting opinions discuss the justiciability of this controversy
before reaching their respective first amendment opinions. Id. at 1338-40, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 88788 (majority's standing and mootness discussion); id. at 1349-51, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 894-96
(Huffman, J., dissenting) (dissent's standing and mootness discussion).
126. Id. at 1336, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
127. Id. The trial court took judicial notice of the "political atmosphere" in southeast San
Diego at the time Hardison canceled DiBona's class. Id. at 1337, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The trial
court found that the administration properly considered the potential harm that could result from
producing Split Second. Id. The court compared producing this play in southeast San Diego with
yelling "'fire" in a crowded theater. Id. Considering the nature of the college as a public
institution, utilizing public money, and operating within a strife-ridden community, the trial court
held that the administrators had the discretion to cancel the production of Split Second to prevent
controversy within the campus or the community. Id. at 1337-38, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
128. Id. at 1341 n.10, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.10. Since the plaintiffs filed no cross-motion
for summary judgment, the court's task was to determine if there were still triable issues of fact.
Id. The court answered this question affirmatively, commenting on the factual record before it to
provide the lower court with guidance on remand. Id.
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then addressed the central issue of this case: The scope of a college
administrator's ability to encroach upon the first amendment rights
of instructors and students when regulating curriculum.13 The
appellate court held that defendants Matthews and Hardison acted
in violation of plaintiffs DiBona and Gundlach's first amendment
rights if the defendants canceled production of Split Second in
order to avoid the controversy the play may have engendered,"'
or if they canceled Split Second because of the allegedly offensive
language contained in the play. 3 2 Thus, the court of appeal
analyzed and invalidated two arguments offered by the college
administrators in defense of their decision to cancel Split Second.
1. Content-Based Discrimination--TheAvoidance of
Controversy
In determining that the defendant administrators may have
violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights by canceling Split
Second, the DiBona majority first turned to case law forbidding
content-based discrimination. 33 However, by failing to engage in
any forum analysis in the majority opinion, the majority departed
from the approach used by the Supreme Court of the United States
over the last twenty years when analyzing constitutional challenges
to regulation of protected speech."M Rather, the DiBona majority
simply stated in a footnote that although the plaintiffs argued that

129. The majority also briefly discussed the defendants' argument that the class was
canceled due to low enrollment. Id. at 1340, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 888-89. This claim was dismissed
by the majority as having misconstrued the real issue; namely, that the cancellation of the class
was directly related to the content of Split Second. Id. at 1340-41, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
130. Id. at 1341 n.9, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.9. (stating that the court read the record as
containing objections by the defendant to production of Split Second as part of the curriculum of
an ECC drama class).
131. Id. at 1344, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
132. Id. at 1346-47, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
133. Id. at 1340-44, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 888-91 (citing to Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10
Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973), Brown v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1986)).
134. See supra notes 29 - 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
adoption of a forum analysis in Irst amendment decisions).
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the defendants had created a public forum, this classification was
not helpful because the majority believed the defendants were
simply exercising control over curriculum that had not created a
public forum. 135 The majority then went on to apply standards
utilized by the Supreme Court of the United 1States
only when the
36
exists.
forums
public
a
determined
has
Court
For example, the DiBona majority determined that college
administrators may not censor speech unless the censorship is
necessary to serve the compelling state interest of preventing
disturbances on campus. 137 As authority, the court cited Tinker v.
Des Moines,13 a decision which dealt with noncurricular
"symbolic" speech by students. 139 Although Tinker was decided
prior to the Court's adoption of forum analysis as a method of
determining when the government can restrict speech on the
government's property,"4 later decisions have recognized that
university campuses, at least as to university students, possess
many of the characteristics of a public forum. 4 '
The DiBona court also stated that a college or university
administrator's interest in avoiding disturbances on campus cannot
support the suppression of speech unless the speech is "likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest., 142

135. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1341 n.9, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.9. See infra notes 193 196 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of the court's failure to examine the forum

issue).
136.

DiBona,220 Cal. App. 3d at 1342-43, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91. See infra note 178

and accompanying text (discussing the DiBona dissent and Justice Huffman's belief that when
activities may be fairly characterized as part of the school curriculum, the administration has not
created a public forum and therefore the constitutional mandates governing regulation of speech

in a public forum are not applicable). See also supra notes 35 - 39 and accompanying text
(discussing standards applied by the Court in public and nonpublic forums).
137. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1342-44,269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
138. Id. at 1342-44, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503
(1969)). See supra notes 58 - 62 and accompanying text (discussing Tinker).
139. 7inker, 393 U.S. at 505.
140. See U.S. v. Kokinda, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990) (stating that since its decision in

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court has adopted a forum analysis).
141. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5 (1981) (collecting cases and discussing
to what extent universities can and have been classified as public forums).
142. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1342, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (quoting Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
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143
As support, the majority cited Terminiello v. Chicago.
Terminiello, like Tinker, was a case decided before the Supreme
Court adopted a forum analysis approach to first amendment
decisions. However, Terminiello was also a case that dealt with
public forum speech; namely, the rights of a speaker at a public
meeting."44
The DiBona majority found that neither the clear and present
danger or the substantial interference requirements had been
satisfied simply because the religious community opposed
production of Split Second, or because the southeast San Diego
community was agitated over racial issues in the wake of the
Sagon Penn murder trial. 45 Rather, these concerns presented a
classic illustration of a constitutionally insufficient
"undifferentiated fear" of disturbance. 4 6 Because defendants
Matthews and Hardison were unable to show a clear and present
danger to the school or the public (the Terminiello standard), or
even that the play would materially and substantially interfere with

143. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
144. TerrinieUo,337 U.S. at 2-3. The DiBona court also relied on Brown v. Board of
Regents of University of Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1986). In Brown,'the court found
that university students were unconstitutionally denied the right to receive controversial ideas

when a university-owned, but non-classroom related, film theater canceled a presentation of Hail
Mary, a controversial film depicting the birth of Christ. Brown, 640 F. Supp. at 681. The theater
canceled the film because of opposition from the community and the state legislature. Id. at 67677. The DiBona majority drew factual and decisional parallels between the DiBona and Brown
opinions, citing with approval Brown's finding that "action taken by an arm of the state merely
to avoid controversy from the expression of ideas is an insufficient basis for interfering with the
right to receive information." DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1344, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (quoting
Brown, 640 F. Supp. at 679). Additionally, the DiBona majority cited Braxton v. Municipal
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973). In Braxton, the California
Supreme Court was called on to determine the constitutionality of a California statute that
allowed state colleges or universities to bar persons from the campus if the college or university
administrator reasonably believed that person had willfully disrupted the orderly operation of the
campus. Braxton, 10 Cal. 3d at 142-43, 514 P.2d at 699-700, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 899-90. The
Braxton court determined that the statute in question would be unconstitutionally overbroad unless
the statute was given a narrow construction, so that the content of speech was not restricted
simply because the speech disrupted the tranquility of the campus or offended the tastes of the
public or the school administrators. Id. at 146-47, 514 P.2d at 701-02, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
145.

DiBona,220 Cal. App. 3d at 1343, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.

146. Id. at 1342-43, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U.S. 503, 508). An undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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the appropriate discipline in the operation of the school (the Tinker
standard), the defendants' censorship of Split Second was
constitutionally inappropriate.' 47
2. Regulation of Offensive Language
The DiBona majority also rejected the defendants' contention
that college administrators should be afforded the same broad
discretion to control their curriculum as has been granted
administrators at elementary and secondary schools in
Kuhlmeier.'" Kuhlmeier, which provided that administrators
could regulate "school-sponsored"' 49 expressive activities so
long as the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns, and the other cases granting broad latitude
150
to high school administrators to regulate expressive activities,

147. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d. at 1343, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
148. Id. at 1346-47, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93. See supra notes 63 - 70 and accompanying
text (discussing Kuhlmeier). The court of appeal found it clear that the trial court had not relied
on the defendants' assertion that they had the right to cancel the play due to its allegedly
offensive language. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1344, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 891. Despite this, the
court of appeal felt obliged to decide this issue, since resolution of the issue in the defendants'
favor could provide an adequate independent basis for defendants to prevail on their motion for
summary judgment. Id. See supra note 102 (giving examples of the offensive language in Spilt

Second).
149. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeler, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) (stating that the question of
"school sponsorship" centers upon whether the first amendment requires a school to
affirmatively promote particular student speech). The Kuhlnejer Court found that the question of
school sponsorship concerned the administration's authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive conduct that might reasonably be perceived by
students, parents or the public to bear the imprimatur of the school. Id. The Court included
expressive conduct that could be considered as part of the school curriculum, whether or not the
conduct occurs in a traditional classroom setting, so long as the conduct is supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart specific knowledge or particular skills to students and audiences.
Id. According to Kuhbneier, educators may exercise greater control over school-sponsored
expression, to assure that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that could be
inappropriate for their age, as well as to ensure that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school. Id. at 271.
150. See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F. 2d 214, 215-17 (3rd Cir., 1981) (holding that high
school administrators could stop an already-rehearsed production of Pippin because of the play's
sexual content); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939, 945 (D. Vermont, 1986) (finding
that the board did not abridge the student's rust amendment rights when the board canceled the
production of a play entitled Runaways, which focused on the problems, exploitation, and abuse
of child runaways).
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were distinguished5 by the majority as having dealt with minors
rather than adults.1 1

The DiBona majority found unpersuasive the defendants'
argument that by recognizing a strong governmental interest in
regulating school-sponsored expressive activities, Kuhlmeier had
created a standard that does not differentiate between the education
of minors and the education of adults.1 52 The majority held that
the rationale underlying the Kuhlmeier school sponsorship rule
cannot be extended to adult education.'53 The court reasoned that
the general public is more likely to view elementary and secondary
school-sponsored student speech as bearing the "imprimatur of the
school" and therefore as being actively promoted by the school,
then it is to view college-sponsored speech as bearing the
imprimatur of, and being actively promoted by, the college. 154 By
rejecting the school-sponsorship rationale, the DiBona majority
indicated its belief that, at the college level, there is less danger
that readers or listeners will be exposed to material that may be

151. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1345-46,269 Cal. Rptr. at 892. See infra notes 63 - 70
and accompanying text (discussing the Kuhlmeier decision).
152. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893. There is support for the
majority's differentiation between adult and minor students. In Bethel v. Fraser,478 U.S. 675
(1986), the Court devoted a significant portion of its opinion to this distinction, characterizing
elementary and secondary school authorities as acting in the place of parents. Bethel, 478 U.S. at
684. In Brown v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674, (D.
Nebraska, 1986), the district court noted that "[j ustification for guarding junior high and high
school students from material thought to be offensive is more easily found than for guarding
college students and the general public from it." Brown, 640 F. Supp. at 680. Additionally, in
Widnmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Court pointed out that university students are young
adults who are less impressionable than younger students. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing portions of Board of Education v. Pico in
which some justices expressed the view that the age difference between college and high school
students might dictate a different result when determining the discretion of the school
administration to control the school environment). See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Students-who, by reason of the Twenty-sixth
Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age-are adults who are members of the
college or university community").
153. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
154. Id.
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inappropriate for their maturity level, or that the views of an
individual speaker will erroneously be attributed to the school.' 55
Additionally, the majority found it unreasonable to say that by
producing a play a college thereby advocates the social or sexual
mores or the indecent language contained in that play.' 56
Although in Kuhlmeier the Supreme Court of the United States
held that school plays such as Split Second are school-sponsored
speech, the DiBona majority found that the use of vulgarity in Split
Second could not be perceived as condoned by college
administrators in the same manner that profanity by student writers
contained in a high school newspaper could be perceived as
condoned by elementary or high school administrators, because
college administrators cannot reasonably be perceived to exercise
as much control over their students as do elementary and high
school administrators.' 57 Even if the language could be perceived
as condoned by the college, the majority believed that Split Second
did not advocate the use of abusive, vulgar speech and racial slurs
because the use of this language in the play results in irrational,
tragic consequences. 5
The DiBona majority conceded that school administrators at
any grade level have considerable discretion when deciding the
content of the school's curriculum, and that the language content
of a play may legitimately be considered in making curriculum
choices.' 59 Indeed, there can be no question that, as a general
rule, school administrators do have broad discretion over the

155. Id. See Hazelwood School DisL v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (discussing
the reasons the Kuhlmeier Court found for allowing greater control by administrators over school-

sponsored speech).
156.
157.
158.

DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1347, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
Id. at 1346-47, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
Id. See supra, notes 101 - 108 and accompanying text (discussing the plot of Split

Second).
159. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1344, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 891. 'Under the guise of free
speech, the First Amendment does not transfer control of a public school's curriculum from
school administrators to individual teachers and students." Id. at 1341, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (holding that the plaintiffs implicitly

conceded that the school board's motivation would not have been unconstitutional had the board
decided to remove the books at issue from the school's library because the books were
pervasively vulgar).
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curriculum they present. 160 However, the DiBona majority
limitations on curriculum be made before a class has
insisted that 161
commenced.

The majority offered no support for its proposition that control
must be exercised before the commencement of a class. One
possible source of support may be found in Board of Educationv.
Pico,162 a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States
dealing with censorship of extra-curricular reading books in a high
school library.163 In Pico, the plurality drew a distinction between1
adding books to and removing books from a school library.'
The plurality felt that removing books from the shelves constituted
suppression of ideas.1" Likewise, in DiBona, since the defendant
administrators initially exercised no control over DiBona's choice
of plays,' the majority opinion could be read as declining to
allow the administration to censor the play after the play had been
cast because this would constitute a suppression of ideas. 67

160. See, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding a
university's decision not to rehire a nontenured teacher because the teacher refused to comply
with the university's request that he stop overemphasizing sex in his health survey course) cert.
denied 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that public
education is committed to the control of state and local authorities, and federal courts should not
ordinarily interfere in the resolution of conflicts arising in the daily operation of school systems);
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (stating that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943) (finding that boards of education have important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they cannot perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights).
161. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1347-48, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
162. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
163. Id. at 856-57.
164. Id. at 871-72.
165. Id.
166. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1334, 1341-42 n.11, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884, 889 n.11.
167. But see Pico, 457 U.S. at 892-93 & n.8 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (stating that "'itdoes
not follow that the decision to remove a book is less 'official suppression' than the decision not
to acquire a book desired by someone") (emphasis in original); Piarowski v. Illinois Community
College, 759 F.2d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that it was unimaginable what Irst
amendment policy would be served by allowing a college to prevent the exhibition of offensive
art, but not allowing the college to order the art removed after it was put on exhibition), cert.
denied 474 U.S. 1007 (1985). The DiBona dissent found that the majority's creation of a "postcommencement" limitation on curriculum control was not authorized by law and was an
unwarranted judicial intrusion upon the school's authority to regulate curriculum content. DiBona,
220 Cal. App. 3d at 1356, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
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It is also possible that the majority's pre-class commencement
limitation was premised solely on the practice by the ECC
administration, and by college and university administrators in
general, of delegating to faculty members the authority to evaluate
and select curriculum."' 8 Although the majority never expressly
cited this as controlling, the ECC's failure to review DiBona's
choice of plays was mentioned more than once in the majority
opinion." Arguably, failure by an administration to exercise
control over initial curriculum decisions could be interpreted to
create a public forum.17 ° But even without finding that a public
forun has been created, this hands-off approach to curriculum
control was clearly significant to the DiBona majority, and the
majority's pre-class commencement limitation may simply be a
statement by the court that if administrators fail to participate in
initial curriculum decisions, they may not be allowed to censor the
curriculum once it has been chosen by the faculty member.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Criticizing the majority for writing an "advisory" opinion,
Justice Huffman took the position that the standing and mootness
issues resolved the case without reaching the first amendment
issues.171 However, realizing that the majority had declared first
amendment policy, Justice Huffman turned to an analysis of the
first amendment issues raised in the case.172
Justice Huffman disagreed with the standards chosen by the
majority for determining the constitutionality of a college

168.

See DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1341-42 n.1 1, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.1 I (discussing

the fact that college administrators often exercise no initial control over an instructor's choice of
classroom materials).
d. at 1334, 1341-42 n.1 1, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884, 889 n.1 1.
169.

170. See infra notes 205 - 209 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the
ECC administrators created a public forum by failing to exercise curriculum control).
171. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1351, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 896 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1352, 269 Cal. Rptr. 896 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
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administration's regulation of curriculum content.173 To Justice
Huffman, requiring college officials to articulate facts "indicating
a 'clear and present danger' to the school or the public that could
have resulted from the production of Split Second was a "cavalier
dismissal" of the defendants' legitimate concerns regarding the
prevention of campus disruption. 74 Justice Huffman also found
the majority's holding that college administrators cannot regulate
curriculum based upon the impact the curriculum may have on the
college or the surrounding community unless there is a clear and
present danger to the college or the community to be in conflict
with the Supreme Court of the United States's decision in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 75 Although conceding
that the Kuhlmeier opinion specifically reserved the question of its
application to college settings, 176 Justice Huffman found the
Kuhlmeier decision to be controlling because Kuhlmeier returned
discretion to school administrators with respect to curriculum

decisions.1 77 To Justice Huffman, Kuhlmeier stands for the
proposition that when activities may be fairly characterized as part
of the school curriculum, the administration has not created a
public forum and therefore the constitutional mandates governing
regulation of speech in a public forum are not applicable. 7 '
Rather, school administrators are entitled to exercise greater control
to ensure that students learn the lessons an activity is designed to
teach, that participants are not exposed to material that may be

173. Id. at 1352-53, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (Huffman, J., dissenting). See supra notes 137 144 and accompanying text (discussing the Tinker and Terminielo standards applied by the
majority).
174. DiBona at 1352-53, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (Huffman, J., dissenting). Justice Huffman's
dissent read the court's decision as implying that curriculum content regulation motivated by the
impact on the school and the community must meet the clear and present danger standard. Id. at
1353, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1353, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (Huffman, J., dissenting). See supra notes 63 - 70
and accompanying text (discussing the Kuhlmeier decision).
176. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1354 n.4, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 898 n.4 (Huffman, J.,
dissenting).
177. Id. at 1354, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (Huffman, ., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1353, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (Huffman, J., dissenting). See infra notes 205 - 209
and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the ECC created a public forum with
regard to the drama department curriculum).
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inappropriate for their maturity level, and that the viewpoint of the
speakers are not inappropriately attributed to the school.' 79
Justice Huffman did not specifically state that he felt the
content of Split Second was inappropriate for college students;
instead, the emphasis of his argument was that college
administrators, not courts, should decide what is or is not
It was imperative to Justice Huffman that an
appropriate.'
administrator's discretion in controlling the school's curriculum not
be second-guessed years later by judges who, removed from the
conflicts facing the school and the surrounding community, may
dismiss as trivial the administration's legitimate effort to act in the
best interest of the school.1"' Justice Huffman found that the
majority had taken away from administrators the authority to
control the school's curriculum that had clearly been given to them
by the Supreme Court of the United States, thus giving free rein to
teachers to choose curriculum without regard to the impact the
content of the curriculum might have upon the school."8 2 Justice
Huffman disagreed that the holding of the Kuhlmeier decision was
dependent upon the age of the student. 83 In Justice Huffman's
view, the holding was designed to return discretion to
administrators when exercising control over curriculum bearing the
"imprimatur of the school.""'
To buttress this position, Justice Huffman cited Seyfried v.
Walton, 85 a pre-Kuhlmeier case upholding cancellation of a high

dissenting).
179. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1353, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (Huffman, J.,
180. Id. at 1354,269 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (Huffman, J., dissenting). See supra notes 94 - 97
and accompanying text (discussing Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association of
the University of Alabama, 867 F.2d 1344 (11 th Cir. 1989), a United States Court of Appeals
decision applying the Kuhlmeier standard because this standard protects autonomous decisionmaking by administrators, which in turn protects academic freedom).
dissenting).
181. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1354, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (Huffman, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. at 1356-57, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (Huffman, J.,
183. Id. at 1354, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (Huffman, J., dissenting). Justice Huffman also
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the general public is less likely to view schoolsponsored speech at the college level as reflecting the policies of the college. Id. at 1354 n.5, 269

Cal. Rptr. at 898 n.5. (Huffman, J., dissenting). See supra notes 153 - 155 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority's view regarding public perceptions of school-sponsored speech at the
college level).

184. DiBond at 1354, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
185.
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school production of the play Pippin because of the
18 6
administration's concerns regarding the play's sexual content.
According to Justice Huffman, Seyfried stands for the proposition
that school administrators should have wide latitude to limit the
performance of a play which the administrators feel is vulgar and
inappropriate, because the administration is more capable than a
court to decide how the school's limited resources should be used
to educate students and integrate them into society."s
Finally, Justice Huffman concluded that the majority created a
"post-commencement" limitation on exercising control over
curriculum that is "an unwarranted judicial intrusion upon the
legitimate authority
of a school to deal with the content of its
1 88
curdculum."
Ill. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

A.

Curriculum Choices Based on PedagogicalConcerns

The DiBona opinion is important to California administrators
because the opinion specifically rejected application of the schoolsponsorship rationale of Kuhlmeier in a college or university
environment. This means a court will be less deferential to college
administrators than it would be under the Kuhlmeier standard
regarding decisions to censor based on the administration's belief
that the subject matter of the curriculum is unsuitable for
students."9

186. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1355, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (Huffman, J., dissenting)
(citing Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 215).
187. Id. at 1355, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (Huffman, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1356, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (Huffman, J., dissenting). See supra, notes 161 - 170
(discussing majority's pre-class commencement limitation).
189. See infra notes 180 - 181 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Huffman's
opinion that by failing to follow Kuhimeier, the majority had shifted control of curriculum from
college administrators to the courts). See also Virgil v. School Bd., 677 F. Supp. 1547, 1553-54
(M.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that under Kuhimeiera court's review of an administrator's censorship
based on legitimate pedagogical concern is limited and the administrator's discretion is broad),
aff'ad, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
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While rejecting the Kuhlmeier standard, the appellate court
imposed a pre-class commencement limitation to this aspect of its
decision,,9 stating that college administrators are entitled to
broad deference in exercising curriculum control having to do with
the literary quality of the curriculum so long as the administrators
make their determination in advance of the first class meeting. 191
The DiBona court noted that the ECC administrators, like most
college administrators, delegate to faculty members the authority to
evaluate and determine curriculum content.19 Through this
observation and the general tenor of their decision, the DiBona
majority implies that to avoid facing greatly diminished control
over the curriculum, administrators should institute curriculum
review and control measures that are designed to require initial
approval of curriculum choices.
B. Curriculum Control Based on the Impact of the Curriculum on
the College or Surrounding Community
Perhaps more important to administrators is the aspect of the
majority's decision dealing with curriculum control based on
concerns over the impact the curriculum may have on the college
or the surrounding community. The fact that the DiBona majority
did not engage in a forum analysis when it discussed this type of
curriculum control,'93 but simply applied public forum standards
to these curriculum decisions, is significant. By applying public
forum standards to this type of curriculum control, the court told
administrators that they cannot make this type of curriculum
decision unless the administration can show that the curriculum
would create a clear and present danger of serious, substantive evil

190. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1348, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
191. 1& See supra notes 161 - 170 and accompanying text (discussing the appellate court's
requirement that curriculum limitations based on literary quality be made in advance of the first

class meeting).
192. DiBona,220 Cal. App. 3d at 1334 & 1341-42 n.1, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 884 & 889 n.11.
193. Id. at 1341 n.9, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.9. See supra note 135 and accompanying text
(discussing the DiBona majority's statement that public forum analysis was not helpful in this
case); supra notes 29 - 45 and accompanying text (describing the forum doctrine).
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(the Terminiello standard)," 9 or that the curriculum would
materially and substantially interfere with the operation of the
school (the Tinker standard).195 In addition, it does not appear
that the DiBona majority applied the pre-class commencement
limitation to this aspect of its decision.196 Thus, it is possible to
read DiBona as imposing the Terminiello and Tinker standards on
curriculum control based on concerns over the impact the
curriculum may have on the college or the surrounding community,
regardless of whether regulation of the curriculum takes place
before or after commencement of the class.
The fact that the DiBona court did not engage in a forum
analysis means that the court mixed apples and oranges, applying
public forum standards to curriculum control without giving
adequate consideration to the impact these standards could have on
traditional curriculum decisions. The appellate court states that
administrative decisions regarding curriculum choices would not
survive first amendment challenge unless the administration's
decision is supported by evidence that the curriculum posed a clear
and present danger of evil to the college or the surrounding
community, or that the curriculum would materially and
substantially interfere with the operation of the school. Taken to its
logical conclusion, the court of appeal seems to assert that at no
time may the ECC administration cancel a class if the
administration's decision to cancel is based on community or
student feedback regarding the class, unless the administration can
prove that the class posed such a clear and present danger or
materially and substantially interfered with the operation of the
school.

194. See supra notes 142 - 144 and accompanying text (discussing the DiBona majority's
application of this standard from Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
195. See supra notes 137 - 141 and accompanying text (discussing the DiBona majority's
application of this standard from Tinker v. Des Moines School District,393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
196. The pre-commencement limitation appears in the second half of the court's decision,
when the court discussed Kuhimeier. A clear break is made between this portion of the decision
and the portion discussing Terminiello and Tinker.

1003

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
1. Impact of Finding a Public Forum Existed in DiBona
On the other hand, if it is possible to interpret DiBona as a
situation in which the ECC administrators created a public forum
by failing to exercise control over the drama department
curriculum, the ultimate holding reached by the DiBona majority
would not change: If the administrators canceled Split Second in
order to avoid the controversy the play might have engendered, the
administrators acted in violation the first amendment rights of
DiBona and his students. However, under this interpretation the use
of the Tinker and Terminiello standards would be consistent with
recent case law because these standards originated in cases in
which public forums existed. 97 More importantly, the appellate
court would not be applying the high public forum standards to the
exercise of control over curriculum that does not create a public
forum. This is important not only from a consistency standpoint--so
that future decisions build on consistently applied precedents--but
also from a practical standpoint. As a practical matter, it will be
very difficult for college administrators exercising curriculum
control to meet the public forum tests applied to them by DiBona.
As a result, college administrators are effectively denied the right
to exercise curriculum control based on concerns the administration
has over the impact the particular curriculum may have on the
college or the surrounding community.
2. Creation of a Public Forum on School Campuses
School facilities are deemed to be public forums only if school
authorities have by policy or practice opened the facilities "for
indiscriminate use by the general public." ' For example, in
Widmar v. Vincent,'99 the University of Missouri at Kansas City
made it a practice to provide university facilities for meetings of
197. See supra notes 141 & 144 and accompanying text (discussing Tinker and Terminiello
as cases in which a public forum could be found to exist).
198. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (relying on Perry
Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
199. 454 U.S. 263, 266 (1981).

1004

1991 / DiBona v. Matthews
registered student groups.0 0 In 1977, the university adopted a
regulation prohibiting the use of university facilities for religious
worship or teaching.20' Although finding that a university differs
significantly from public forums such as streets or parks or
municipal theaters,2' the Widmar court held that, through its
policy of providing facilities for group meetings, the university had
created a public forum. 2 ' 3 Thus, the university had to justify its
exclusion under the constitutional requirements applicable to public
forums.2 '4
It is true that the administrators of the ECC did not
accommodate meetings of drama groups that wished to produce
plays. Rather, the administrators offered a course as part of their
curriculum whereby students could learn about the production of a
play. 0" However, in determining whether or not a public forum
has been created in a school setting, the Supreme Court of the
United States has placed great emphasis on the control exercised
by the administration over the curriculum." 0 For example, in
Kuhlmeier, since the high school administration exercised control
over all aspects of the school newspaper, the administration had not
created a public forum by publishing the newspaper. 0 7 Relying
on Kuhimeier, courts have found a public forum to exist where the
administrative policy appears to place the control of a curricular

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 268 n.5.
203. Id. at 267.
204. Id. See supra notes 35 - 37 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
requirements applicable to public forums).
205. See DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1333, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884
(1990) (discussing the Drama 250 curriculum). See also Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 21516 (3rd Cir., 1981) (upholding the cancellation of a school play based on the administration's
determination that the play was too sexually explicit for the students). "Mhe selection of the
artistic work to be given as the spring production does not differ in principle from the selection of
course curriculum, a process which courts have traditionally left to the expertise of educators."
Id. at 216 (quoting Seyfried v. Walton, 512 F.Supp. 235, 238-39 (D. Del. 1981)).
206. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268-70 (1988).
207. ld. at 270.
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activity in the hands of the students or faculty. °8 Since the policy
of the ECC administration appears to be to place control of the
drama curriculum in the hands of whatever teacher happens to be
under contract for that year to teach the drama class,," the
administration can be said to have created a public forum as to the
production of their drama department plays.
3. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
Alternatively, regardless of whether a public forum has been
created, it may be possible to construe the DiBona opinion as
simply prohibiting viewpoint-based discrimination." Under this
interpretation, forum classification is irrelevant and the Terminiello
and Tinker standards lose their significance as benchmarks that
must be met by administrators exercising curriculum control. The
reason for this is that the government may not regulate the content
of speech in any forum if the government is discriminating against
the speech based upon the speaker's viewpoint.2 '
The administrators in DiBona could be viewed as refusing to
allow production of a play simply because the play depicted a
white man who was so foul-mouthed and insensitive that he could
provoke an otherwise likeable, honest, proud black police officer
to murder him. The message expressed in Split Second that
violence by blacks against whites can be explained, if not justified,
is a viewpoint that is highly derogatory of whites as a race. It is
also a viewpoint that is in keeping with the defense made by Sagon
Penn, the black youth whose trial for shooting two white officers
was going on at the time DiBona chose to produce Split

208. See, e.g., Lueth v. St. Clair County Community College, 732 F. Supp. 1410, 1415
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (finding a public forum created by school newspaper when administrators,
through their written policy, appeared to place control of the newspaper in the hands of students).
209. See DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1334 & 1341-42 n.1 l269 Cal. Rptr. at 884 & 889
n.1 I (discussing the fact that no initial approval of the instructor's choice of plays was required).
210. See supra notes 46 - 54 and accompanying text (discussing viewpoint-based

discrimination).
211.
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Second.212 For these reasons, Split Second depicted a viewpoint
that, by all indications, was opposed by, or perhaps feared by, the
ECC administration.
The DiBona court stated that the facts of the case reflected
school officials who were simply concerned with avoiding any
unpleasantness which accompanies unpopular or unorthodox points
of view.213 Therefore, it is possible to interpret the DiBona
decision as simply prohibiting viewpoint-based discrimination by
an administration engaging in censorship based on the content of
curriculum because of their concern over the impact the curriculum
might have on the college or the surrounding community.
CONCLUSION

In DiBona v. Matthewst the California Court of Appeal
held that a community college could not censor the production of
a play chosen as curriculum for a drama class unless the
administrators could show the play either created a clear and
present danger of serious, substantive evil rising above public
unrest or annoyance or materially and substantially interfered with
the operation of the school.215 Additionally, the DiBona court
held that vulgar language alone in a play would not provide
adequate justification for cancellation of the play because there is
little legitimate pedagogical concern on the part of collegiate
216
administrators to protect college students from vulgar language.
The DiBona opinion is important to California administrators
because the opinion expressly declined to apply the schoolsponsorship rationale of Kuhlmeier to college or university
administrators. Beyond this, it is unclear how DiBona will impact
administrators making curriculum decisions. It is possible that

212. See supra notes 109 - 113 and accompanying text (discussing Sagon Penn and the
ongoing murder trial).
213. DiBona v. Matthews, 269 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1343, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 890-91 (1990).
214. 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1990), cerL denied, II1 S. Ct. 557 (1990).
215. Id. at 1343-44, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
216. Id. at 1346-47, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
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DiBona may be construed to require California college and
university administrators to meet prohibitively high standards when
exercising curriculum control based on concerns over the impact
the curriculum may have on the college or the surrounding
community. On the other hand, the majority's opinion can be read
as imposing these high standards only when administrators fail to
exercise control over the initial curriculum decision process.
Finally, the court's decision may be viewed as simply prohibiting
viewpoint-based discrimination. Whatever impact the DiBona
decision may have on the curriculum review processes of
California colleges and universities, it is clear that the stringent
protection of free expression at the collegiate level is at the core of
the appellate court's decision in DiBona.
By rejecting the Kuhlmeier "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concern" standard for content-based censorship due to
the administration's concern that the subject matter of the
curriculum is unsuitable for adult students, the court has not acted
in an extraordinary manner. Many writers have predicted that this
standard, originating in a case dealing with high school curriculum,
would not be extended to the college setting.2 7 Even the DiBona
majority's pre-class commencement requirement for censorship
based on concern that the curriculum is unsuitable can be supported
by existing case law.2" 8 However, application by the appellate
court of the "clear and present danger" and "material and
substantial interference" standards to administrators exercising
curriculum control based on concern by the administration over the
impact the curriculum could have on the campus or surrounding
community can be viewed as extraordinary. Here the appellate
court departed from accepted first amendment analysis, applying

217. See, e.g., Note, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: IncreasedRegulation of the
University Press,40 ALA. L REv. 267, 279-81 (1988) (positing that Kuhhneier should not apply
to public college and university campuses because students are no longer children and do not
need enculturation by the state). See also Student Gov't. Assn. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of
Massachusetts, 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir., 1989) (stating that Kuhlineler is not applicable to
college newspapers).
218. See supra notes 162 - 167 (discussing the pre-class commencement requirement and
the Pico decision).
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public forum standards to nonpublic forum curriculum decisions.
Unless the court was interpreting the ECC administration's actions
as viewpoint-based discrimination, or the ECC administration's
failure to exercise control over the faculty's curriculum choices is
viewed as creating a public forum despite the court's assertion to
the contrary, application of public forum standards to curriculum
control leaves unclear exactly how far this court would go when
striking a balance between free speech rights of students and
faculty and the ability of college administrators to exercise control
over the college's curriculum.
Nannette J. Heiser
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